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An Essay on the Constitutional
Parameters of Federal Impeachment*
By RONALD D. ROTUNDA**

INTRODUCTION

The time is particularly appropriate for discussing the federal
law of impeachment because impeachment is not currently a part
of our daily news diet.1 We can thus discuss this issue calmly,
without the pressures, either conscious or subconscious, of result-oriented thinking.
I propose to examine some of the legal issues relating to
impeachment in an effort to outline what the constitutional
definition should be. Much has already been written on this

* Adapted from a speech given at the Symposium on Judicial Discipline and
Impeachment, sponsored by the Kentucky Law Journal.
** Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., Harvard University, 1967; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1970. I would like to give special thanks to Richard Underwood,
who read an earlier draft of this piece and made several helpful suggestions.
I In October 1986, Federal District Judge Harry Clairborne of Nevada became
the first judge in approximately a half century to be impeached by the House and
removed by the Senate after he was convicted in Federal court of income tax evasion.
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515 (4th ed. 1987). Judge

Miles Lord resigned after various charges were made against him concerning allegedly
intemperate statements that he made in open court. See Gardiner v. A.H. Robbins Co.,
Inc., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984).
Investigation of bribery allegations concerning Judge Alcee L. Hastings of Florida
continued after his acquittal in a criminal trial. See Matter of Certain Complaints Under
Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986). A special judicial panel reported "clear
and convincing evidence" that Judge Hastings conspired to solicit a $150,000 bribe and
"attempted to corruptly use his office for personal gain." It then recommended impeachment by Congress. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1987, at 15, col. 1-4. Unlike Judge
Clairborne, Judge Hastings was acquitted of bribery charges in his criminal trial. However, William Borders, Jr. was convicted at a separate trial of conspiring to arrange
sending the bribe to Hastings. The special judicial panel also accused Hastings of giving
false testimony and presenting fabricated evidence at his criminal trial.
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subject, 2 and I have no intention of reploughing those fields
which have already been well furrowed. Much of our recent
literature on impeachment has been produced in large part because of President Nixon's Watergate troubles of a decade and

a half ago. 3 President Nixon has, unwittingly, forced us to think
about such issues.
I.

IMPEACHMENT AND THE ROLE OF HISTORY

One cannot talk about impeachment in this country without
-reference to our constitutional history. That history is obviously
relevant, yet it is important to keep it in perspective. I do not

share the views of those who argue either that we must be slaves
to history, 4 or that the views of the framers "are neither relevant

nor morally binding." ' 5

2

See generally Lawrence, A Brief of the Authorities upon the Law of Impeachable

Crimes and Misdemeanors, CONG. GLOBE SUPPLEMNT, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1868);
R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROELEMs (1973); I. BRANT, IMPEACHmENT: TRIALS & ERRORS (1972); P. HOFFR & N. HALL, IMPEACHmENT IN AMERICA: 16351805 (1984); J. LABovrrz, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEAcHmEr (1978); Dwight, Trial by Impeachment, 6 AM. L. REv. (n.s.) 257 (1867); Ethridge, The Law of Impeachment, 8 Miss.
L.J. 283 (1936); Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional
Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1970-71); Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment
Power, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 719 (1970-71); Simpson, FederalImpeachments, 64 U. PA.
L. REv. 651 (1916) (pt. I); Simpson, Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 803
(1916) (pt. II); Walthall, Executive Impeachment: Stealing Firefrom the Gods, 9 NEw
ENG. L. REv. 257, 291 (1974); Yankwich, Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the
Federal Constitution, 26 GEo. L.J. 849 (1937-38); Note, The Exclusiveness of the
Impeachment Power Under the Constitution, 51 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1937); Note,
Vagueness in the Constitution: The Impeachment Power, 25 STAN. L. REv. 908 (1973).
3 See, e.g., REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATrVES, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see also I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOwAx, & J.
YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 7.1-7.3
(1986).
Professor Raoul Berger, for example, may place too much reliance on history.
See R. BERGER, supra note 2. In addition, the history is too often not as clear as he
indicates.
As discussed below, the framers explicitly rejected various British impeachment
practices. See, e.g., J. KALLENBACH, THE AmauCAN C
ExEcuTivE 51 (1966).
C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 103 (1978). Professor L.
Tribe has been quoted as arguing that James Madison never suggested that the framers
intended posterity o rely on original intent as the oracular guide in explaining the
Constitution. Se - akove, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec.
1986, at 77, 79.
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I believe a middle ground exists between rejecting any role
for history and unthinking reliance on history. It may be helpful
and useful to refer to original intent, even if a strict view of
history may not be controlling, when it is read in context. We
need not pretend that all judges and commentators who look at
history-as weli as the other tools of judicial review such as
text, structure, logic, and precedent-will reach the same conclusions regarding the law of impeachment, but at least they will
start at the same base line.
The issues relating to original intent and to the uses of history
6
have created almost a cottage industry in scholarly literature.
In this short Essay, I cannot hope to canvas all of the arguments,
but I hope to set them in proper perspective by briefly looking
at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the contrast the
framers drew between public intent and private intent.
Soon after the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
began their deliberations in that hot summer in Philadelphia in
1787, they turned to the question of secrecy. Though there was
little agreement on many issues, they quickly agreed to conduct
all deliberations in secret. 7 To encourage the delegates to speak
in complete candor and not play to the press, they also decided
there would be no calling of the yeas and nays by delegate
name. 8 Votes would only be recorded by states. To make news
leaks more difficult, members could inspect the journal of the
proceedings but would not be permitted to make any copy of
any of its entries. The delegates also ordered that "nothing
spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published or communicated without leave." 9 And, to prevent any unauthorized
entry, the Convention placed sentries both inside and outside
the meeting place. A contemporary observer reported that these
sentries "appear to be very alert in the performance of their
duty."10

6

See 3 R.

ROTUNDA,

J. NowAx, & J. YOUNG, supra note 3, at §§ 23.2-23.5

(1986).
, 5 J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION HELD
PmILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 127 (1845 reprinted 1937).
SId. at 123. Madison's unofficial notes sometimes record the names of individuals
who were for or against certain questions.
' M. FARRwND, THE FRAMIN OF THE C6 NSTITUTION 58 (1913).
10Id.
AT
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The importance the delegates attached to the secrecy of their
private deliberations is symbolized by an episode involving George
Washington. Washington, we must remember, was at the zenith
of his popularity. Professor Max Farrand tells us that the "feeling towards him was one of devotion, almost awe and reverence.
His presence in the convention was felt to be essential to the
success of its work . . "" During the course of the Convention,
one of the delegates accidentally dropped a copy of some proposals. Another delegate, discovering the lost papers, turned
them over to Washington, who scolded the unknown delegate
for losing the papers: "I must entreat gentlemen to be more
careful, lest our transactions get into the newspapers, and disturb
the public repose by premature publications.' 2 Washington then
threw the papers on the table, demanded that the owner pick
them up, and left the room. The delegates reacted like scared
children: no one came forward. No one was willing to accept
the responsibility for this possible breach of secrecy.
Not until many years after the Constitution had been ratified
did Congress order that those proceedings and fragmentary min3
utes which were in the hands of the Government, be printed.
The people who publicly debated and ratified the new Constitution had no access to the Convention notes. In fact, when
President Washington, in his message to Congress of March 30,
1796, referred to the unpublished Journal of the Constitutional
Convention in support of a particular interpretation of the Constitution, various members of Congress thought that his reference had violated the Convention's rule of secrecy.1 4 Much of

"

Id. at 15.

32

C.

"

WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 139 (1928).
The Resolve of Congress of March 27, 1818, ordered printed those papers in

the possession of John Quincy Adams that related to the Constitutional Convention.
These papers included the minutes of the Journal of the Convention. Making of the
Constitution, id. at 707. The year 1821 saw the publication of the notes of Robert Yates,
a member of the Convention. Yates, however, left the Conventi6n on July 10, 1787,
over two months before the Convention adjourned. Id. at 721, 798. Madison's Notes
were not published until 1840. Warren notes: "It is a singular fact that it was not until
fifty-three years after the Constitution was signed that the American people were afforded
any adequate knowledge of the debates of the Federal Convention." Id. at 802.
4

See 5

ANNALS OF CONG.

775-76 (1796) (remarks of Representative James Madi-

son); id. at 734 (remarks of Representative Albert Gallatin). Madison also wrote to
Jefferson explaining that Washington's use of the Convention's Journal violated the
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what we now know comes from one person, Madison, who took
it upon himself to compile a more complete and unofficial
record. But Madison's notes were not published until 1840.11 It
is common, at the present time, to comb with fine care the
various notes taken during that Convention as if they were a
magical pinata which, if hit at the right angle, will unlock the
Constitution's secrets. But the Generation of 1787 did not have
access to any of these notes or minutes. Writings which did not
see the light of day until over a half century after the Convention
was held could not have influenced the ratifiers, because they
were hidden from them.
That is not to say that the Convention notes are necessarily
irrelevant as an aid in interpreting the written document. The
secret Convention notes may help tell us what certain words
may mean, how much language may be stretched, or how much
it may be restricted. 16 But the ratifiers of the new Constitution
should not be held to have approved of the hidden Convention
notes any more than your incorporation of my language necessarily incorporates my hidden intent. 17 As a logical matter, a
person cannot be held to have adopted someone else's hidden,
secret thoughts. 18 As Representative Albert Gallatin noted during
the congressional debates on the Jay Treaty, it is wrong to rely
on "the opinions and constructions of those persons who had
framed and proposed the Constitution, opinionsgiven in private,
constructions unknown to the people when they adopted the
instrument."19

Convention's rule of secrecy. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 4,
1796), quoted in C. WARREN, supra note 12, at 796.
11C. WARREN, supra note 12, at 802.
6 Thus Luther Martin, one of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
offered, as an aid to interpretation, his eyewitness account of the Convention's view on
intergovernmental immunity during oral argument. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 372 (1819).
11 Cf. United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
11While I have based my argument upon logic and the common meaning of
language, Professor Powell's elaborate historical research also supports this conclusion.
See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885
(1985); cf. R. ROTUNDA, Tia PoLTms oF LANGUAGE (1986).
,1 5 ANNALs OF CONGREss 734 (1796) (emphasis added).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VoL. 76

Some contemporary commentators go well beyond this logical point when they maintain that the framers did not intend
the judiciary to look at evidence of public intent, such as The
Federalist Papers, the historical circumstances, and the state
ratifying conventions.2" The historical evidence hardly compels
this conclusion. While Madison, for example, opposed looking
at secret, subjective intent, expressed in the halls of the Philadelphia Convention, he also urged us to look "for the meaning
of that instrument ... not in the General Convention which
proposed, but in the State Conventions which accepted and

ratified

''
it. 21

Rather than talking about the framers' intent, one should be
more precise and refer to the ratifiers' intent, what Hamilton in
The Federalist Papers called "the intention of the people." 22
-o Parts of Professor Powell's study may be interpreted as presenting this argument.
See Powell, supra note 18, at 919 (noting that various Congressmen opposed looking at
"extraneous sources" such as the state ratifying conventions). Professor Powell argues
that, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793), it was proper for the Court
to ignore "the virtually unanimous response" of the federalists as expressed in The
Federalist No. 81 and instead to look just at the text and to interpret it without reference
to such historical background. Id. at 922-23. Chisholm, one should recall, was hardly a
model of proper interpretation. It was soon overturned by the eleventh amendment.
Some commentators, in opposing any look to history, argue that Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was not true to historical intent because many
members of the Congress who opposed the fourteenth amendment also supported school
segregation. Thus, they argue, if you look to history, you must reject Brown. M. PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HumAN RIHTs: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGrrACY
oF CONsTITUTIONAL PoLicAKmIow BY TE JUDICIARY 2, 68 (1982). However, we must
look at the intent of the public and of the ratifiers, not merely the opinion of certain
members of Congress. While the intent of the ratifiers and of the framers may not be
entirely clear, it is true that after the Civil War, many people did intend to eliminate all
vestiges of slavery. The fact that Congress enacted the broad protection of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 is proof of that intent. The Supreme Court invalidated this law in
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Looking at the wording of the fourteenth
amendment is also relevant; the amendment promises "equal protection," not "separate
but equal protection." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
21 C. WARREN, supra note 12, at 794; see Letter from James Madison to S.H.
Smith (Feb. 21, 1827), Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821),
Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), cited in id. at 800-01 n.l.
Three states did not report their state constitutional conventions. In three instances
the state conventions were thoroughly reported; in the remainder of the states, they were
reported "badly or very incompletely." I J. GOEBEL, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs
DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SuPREME COURT OF TE

UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND

BEOINNINGS TO 1801 324 (1971). On the state conventions, see generally id. at 324-412.
2 Tim FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), reprinted in R. ROTUNDA, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 10 (2d ed. 1985).
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Thus, the early case law and early constitutional authorities
recognized that publicly available authorities, such as The FederalistPapers, offered a contemporary and very relevant explication of the meaning of the new Constitution.2 3 Turning to The
FederalistPapers was one of Justice Story's "Rules of Interpretation. "2
History, of course, must be read in context.25 Sometimes it
may tell us that a particular clause was calculated to be ambiguous, perhaps to paper over differences, perhaps to provide for
flexibility, or perhaps to allow for evolutionary growth in the
law. And reasonable people will, at times, interpret the evidence
differently. But these obvious facts certainly do not mean that
the intent of the ratifiers is irrelevant, even if that intent is
sometimes difficult to discover. Although Pharaoh's dreams were
not easy to interpret, Joseph did not therefore advise Pharaoh
to ignore them.
Some who attack the use of original intent argue that to
require a modem day judge to apply a constitutional provision
only to the precise situations envisioned two hundred years ago
is wrong. And so it is; the argument is a strawman. We "cannot
know how the framers would vote on specific cases today, in a
very different world than the one they knew." 26 The Constitution, as Marshall said, was "intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs ....

[and to] exigencies which, if foreseen at all,

must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for
as they occur." 27 A belief in the relevance of history hardly
requires any doctrinaire, unsophisticated, mechanical application
of the views of the past. The framers and the ratifiers of the

3

E.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821); McCulloch, 17

U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 372, 433 (Luther Martin's argument to the Court included reading
extracts from The Federalist Papers and the Virginia and New York Conventions.); see
3 R. RoTuNDA, J. NowAx, & J. YourN, supra note 3, at § 23.35.
11See JOsEPH STORY'S CMNMsA-RMas ON THE CoNsTrrT=oN 134, 148 (R. Rotunda
& J. Nowak eds. 1987) [hereinafter J. STORY].
2 Sometimes the authors of The Federalist Papers "exaggerated [the Constitu-

tion's] advantages, and spread over the objectionable features the gloss of plausible
construction." State v. McBride, 24 S.C.L. (Rice) 400 (S.C. 1839).
2E.g.,
Bork, in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution 46

(1986).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
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Constitution intended a flexible document, designed to endure
28
for ages.
Historical evidence does have a role to play in exploring the
parameters of federal impeachment. Let us now consider the
impeachment power and its historical context.
II.

THE LANGUAGE OF IMPEACHMENT IN THE CONSTITUTION

Our pithy Constitution makes several references to impeachment. We are told that the House of Representatives "shall have
the sole Power of Impeachment. ' 29 The Senate, in turn,
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting
for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When
the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice
shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the
Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 30

If two-thirds of the Senate vote to "convict," the only
sanction is present removal. and future disqualification from
holding "any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United

States.

'31 Such

a person is still "liable and subject to Indictment,

Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law." ' 32

11 Thomas Jefferson seriously proposed that the new Constitution should automatically expire by 1823 at the latest, because each new generation, he thought, should
have to come to terms with its own constitution. Jefferson selected that number because
34 years was the average remaining life expectancy of people who had reached the age
of majority (21 years) in 1789, the year the new government began. The generation of
1787 rejected this sunset proposal. Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution:
Part I, Processes of Change, 1984 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 933, 937. The Constitution should
have a longer life than that. As John Marshall later concluded: "We must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
Marshall, by the way, believed that this conclusion was what the framers had "entertained." Id. Our Constitution should not be interpreted with the strictness of a municipal
Code, because that interpretation would be contrary to the original intent.
The private debates also support this conclusion. At one point Madison and
Sherman proposed a particular change to allow more flexibility and to take into account
future growth in the new country. One delegate objected: "It is not to be supposed that
the government will last so long as to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this
vast country, including the western territory, will, one hundred and fifty years hence,
remain one nation?" The delegates apparently thought so; they opted for Madison's
change. 5 J.ELLioTT, supra note 7, at 392.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
30 Id.
at art. I, § 3, cl.6.
31 Id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
32Id.
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Although the President's pardoning power is broad, 3 even
it cannot remove the stigma of disqualification of an impeachment. The pardoning clause specifically provides that the President is given the power to pardon "for Offenses against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." 34
The actual grounds for impeachment and the persons subject
to impeachment are found at the end of Article II, which deals
with the "executive Power." Article II provides:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
35
and Misdemeanors.
Article III provides that no jury trial exists in cases of
impeachment. The language used is interesting, for it recognizes
that impeachable offenses may also be crimes:
The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed .... 36
Whether an impeachable offense must also be an indictable crime
is an issue discussed below.
III.

CIwu

OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES

The Constitution limits the impeachment power to "all civil
Officers of the United States." ' 37 Once it was decided that impeachment should not reach private citizens who have never held
public office, and that punishment should not extend beyond
removal from, and permanent disqualification of, holding office,

,3 E.g., Schnick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87
(1925); Illinois Central Railroad v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92 (1890); United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1867);
Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1856). See generally W. Httr4EERT, TaE PA DONING POWER OF Tm PRsmEr (1941).
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. I (emphasis added); see 1 M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVnoN OF 1787 292 (1937); 2 id. at 146, 171, 185, 411,
419, 575, 599, 648.
3, U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
36 Id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
37U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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this restriction was natural.38 "Civil" excludes only military officers, who are removable by court martial. 39 Thus, judges, as
well as all legislators and all executive officials, whether in "the
highest or the lowest departments" of the national government,
are subject to impeachment. 40
The bare language in the Constitution regarding impeachment of "all civil Officers ' 41 raises various questions about its
scope. Should the resignation of an officer preclude either the
initiation or the completion of an impeachment? Because the
sanction for impeachment from federal office extends not only
to present removal from office but also to future disqualification
from ever holding any other office of "honor, Trust, or Profit
under the United States," 42 resignation should not moot the
sanction. The officer should not be able to short-circuit the
impeachment inquiry by resignation, with the hope of later
reentering public service, when memories have faded and evidence is stale. Congress, of course, may not wish to initiate or
to complete impeachment of an officer who has resigned, but
that decision is more a matter of prosecutorial discretion than a
constitutional lack of jurisdiction. Although the Constitution in
Article II refers to "all civil Officers, ' 43 that language in context
means only that those who are still civil officers at the time of
conviction of the impeachment must be removed. Article I does
not refer to "all civil Officers" and provides only a limitation
on the penalty, not a limitation on jurisdiction."
In his influential nineteenth-century treatise on constitutional
law, Justice Story said that impeachment "is strictly confined to
civil officers of the United States. '"45 Story also talked of "confining the impeaching power to persons holding office." If
such a person is "impeached for his conduct, while in office, he

3 J. STORY, supra note 24, at 284.
31 Id. at 285-86; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
,0 J. STORY, supra note 24, at 285.
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
42 Id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
43 Id. at art. II, § 4.
- See Simpson, supra note 2, at 817 (pt. II).
41 J. STORY, supra note 24, at 283.
" Id. at 284.
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could not justly complain, since he was placed in that predicament by his own choice." 47
In context, however, Story appeared to be concerned primarily with distinguishing the American practice from the contemporary British practice, which allowed impeachment of all
peers and commoners. That is, for Congress to seek to impeach
private citizens for engaging in offenses against the federal government would be improper. America was well aware of this
English practice and rejected it. In one case, Parliament had
impeached a rector of a Church for the content of his sermons.4
In another instance, Parliament impeached a private individual
for "speaking lightly" of a public official. 49 The punishment in
that case included being branded and also life imprisonment in
the Tower of London.50 The Constitution rejected these precedents and limited the sanction to removal from, and future
disqualification of, public office.51
In the United States, the historical evidence regarding jurisdiction to impeach a federal officer who resigned appears to
support jurisdiction, though the history is not without ambiguity,
and what is popularly called "historical precedents" are more
properly called "historical examples." The issues of jurisdiction
to impeach were raised early in our history during the impeachment trial of former Senator William Blount, in 1797. Blount's
lawyer argued that no jurisdiction existed 5 2 because the Senate
had already expelled Senator Blount for "having been guilty of
a high misdemeanor, entirely inconsistent with his public trust
and duty as a Senator." 53 Nonetheless, the House still impeached
54
Blount.

47 Id. (emphasis added). Story noted that if the person subject to impeachment no
longer holds office, "it might be argued with some force, that [the impeachment] would
be a vain exercise of authority." Id. at 289. But given the sanction of disqualificationStory argued that "a judgment of disqualification might still be pronounced"-the

exercise would not be a vain one.
4 3 HiND's PRECEDENTS OF nTm
4 Id. at § 2015.

HousE OF REPRSMENTATIVES

§ 2013 (1907).

"Id.
" U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 3, cl.
7.

14

See 8 ANNALs OF CONG. 2254, 2264, 2291 (1798).
5 ANNALs OF CONG. 43-44 (1797).
Id. at 440-59. Before the Senate, Blount's lawyer not only argued the jurisdic-
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In 1876, the House unanimously impeached Secretary of War
Belknap. During the Senate trial, Belknap's counsel argued that
the Senate had no jurisdiction because Belknap had resigned
prior to his impeachment. The Senate rejected this argument by
a vote of thirty-seven to twenty-nine, 5 but then failed to convict
Belknap of any of the articles; though the vote to convict on
56
the various articles was as high as thirty-seven to twenty-nine,
57
it was still short of the two-thirds constitutional requirement.
IV.

SANCTIONS

The framers clearly rejected the English practice which allowed for impeachment sanctions beyond removal and disqualification; for example, British impeachment could result in
imprisonment.5 8 Two places exist where the Constitution speaks
directly to the issue of sanctions. Article II provides that all civil
officers of the United States "shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors. ' ' 59 The most natural reading of
this language seems to provide for a nondiscretionary sanction.
If someone is impeached, he or she must be removed from office
(assuming that person does not first resign).
In Article I, the Constitution further provides that judgment
in impeachment cases "shall not extend further than to removal
from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any [federal]
Office." 6 Reading this language in conjunction with the relevant
Article II clause, a Senate judgment against the civil officer
apparently must lead to removal, but the Senate has discretion
as to whether to impose any bar-permanent, temporary, or no
bar-to holding any other federal office.6'
tional point but also claimed that Blount had committed no high crime or misdemeanor.
The Senate ultimately dismissed the charge by a vote of 14-11. 5 ANALS OF CONG. 2319

(1799). The dismissal was ambiguous because some Senators may have believed that no
impeachable offense existed even if jurisdiction existed.
19 CONG. REc. 76 (1876).
Id. at 347-57,
5' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
11See, e.g., 3 HieD's PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
48, at

§§

REPRESENTATIVES,

2013-15 (discussing British precedent).
59 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).
6 Id. at art. 1, § 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added).
61 Story concurs in this analysis. J. STORY, supra note 24, at 289.

supra note
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V.

THE STANDARD OF PROOF

The constitutional language offers little hint as to what the
standard of proof should be. We know that impeachment is
regarded as serious business, but also that punishment cannot
include imprisonment or fine, 62 which are the usual sanctions
for conviction of a crime.
The seriousness and the uniqueness of impeachment caution
that it should not be too readily or too easily accomplished. The
standard of proof should be a high one, such as "clear and
convincing evidence"-the standard used in important, noncriminal cases. 63 That standard is thoroughly discussed in the case
law and has a long pedigree in the common law. Clear and
convincing evidence is typically defined as
that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the
allegation sought to be established. It is intermediate, being
more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such
certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal.64
The standard of proof of a preponderance of the evidence,
used in ordinary civil cases, is insufficient in an impeachment
action because of the seriousness of the event. Similarly, the
standard used in criminal cases-proof beyond a reasonable
doubt-is too high. That test is only used in criminal cases
because the defendant may be imprisoned and may suffer loss
of liberty. In the House Impeachment Committee on Richard
Nixon, the staff and members of the Committee, (both those
who voted for and those who voted against impeachment), agreed
that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard was the cor65
rect standard.
No reason exists to believe that the standard of proof or the
elements of an impeachable offense should vary depending on

62

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.

Cf. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 308 (Alaska 1975) (use of "clear and convincing" standard in judicial disciplinary proceedings).
6 Fred C. Walker Agency, Inc. v. Lucas, 211 S.E.2d 88, 92 (Va. 1975) (quoting
Cross v. Ledford, 120 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ohio 1954)).
11J. LABovrrz, supra note 2, at 193.
"
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the person subject to impeachment. The framers obviously
thought that a presidential impeachment was particularly significant, for they provided that the Chief Justice should preside in
such cases. 6 To the extent that the framers may have thought
it was necessary to give the President extra protection, they
provided for it explicitly by requiring the Chief Justice to preside.
Sometimes it is suggested 67 that Article III judges could be
impeached under a looser standard than the President or other
officers because the Constitution provides that judges "shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour. ' 68 However, a closer
reading of the Constitution demonstrates otherwise. Judges, like
all other civil officers, can only be removed by "Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors. ' 69 The framers were apparently contrasting
the unlimited term of a federal judge ("for good Behaviour")
with the fixed terms for the President, the Vice President, a
senator, and a representative. Both the fixed and the unfixed
terms can be ended only if there is conviction for "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." No evidence
exists that the framers desired to compromise the independence
of federal judges by making it easier to remove them.7 0

' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.6. The framers provided that the Chief Justice
preside because they believed the Vice President, who normally presides over the Senate,
would be subjected to an awkward conflict of interest position. See J. STORY, supra
note 24, at 276.
67 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 11912-14 (1970) (statement by then Congressman
Gerald Ford in connection with the attempted impeachment of Justice Douglas). Ford
also argued that "an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of
Representatives considers to be at a given moment in history." Id. at 11913.
6' U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
" Id. at art. II, § 4.
70 We know from the secret Convention debates that one of the delegates attacked
the "good behaviour" language of article III and urged that federal judges be removable
by the executive simply on application of the House and Senate; Governor Morris and
others strongly -objected because removal by application alone would weaken the independence of the judiciary, would be applied arbitrarily, and would deprive the judges
of a trial of the charges. See I M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 116, 226, 244, 292; 2
id. at 44, 132, 146, 172, 186, 428. The delegates then rejected any proposal to facilitate
the removal of federal judges. Id. at 428-29; see Berger, Impeachment of Judges and
"Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475, 1511-12 (1970).
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VI.

WHAT IS AN IMPEACHABLE OFFENSE?

The Constitution offers a brief definition of what constitutes
an impeachable offense when it provides that "all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors. ' 71 The Constitution then narrowly
defines treason to "consist only in levying War against them

[i.e., against the United States], or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them Aid and Comfort." 72 However, the Constitution
nowhere makes any attempt at further definition.
At several points the Constitution refers to "impeachment"
on the clear assumption that an impeachable offense may also
be a criminal act. The constitutional language borrows from
criminal law language. After the House impeaches, the Senate
tries the impeachment, with a two-thirds majority of the Senators
present needed before the person "shall be convicted."7 3 If the
person is "convicted" he or she is still liable in a criminal
"Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment according to
[criminal] Law." 7 4 Article III warns us that the "trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." 75
Treason and bribery, specifically mentioned as constituting impeachable offenses,7 6 are, of course, criminal acts-if relevant
statutes so provide and the elements of the statutory offense are
met.7 7 Are "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" also limited
to criminal acts?
The constitutional language recognizes that some impeachable offenses may be crimes, and, if they are, no requirement
exists that the indictment must precede the impeachment.78 In
addition, because the sanction for impeachment is limited to
removal and to disqualification, the use of impeachment does
not preclude later criminal trial and punishment.7 9 To say that
1,U.S.

CONST. art. II, § 4.
Id. at art. III, § 3, cl.1.
73 Id. at art. I, § 3, cl.
6 (emphasis added).
74 Id. at art. I, § 3, cl.7 (emphasis added).
7' Id. at art. III, § 2, c 3 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at art. II, § 4.
- See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2381 (West 1970) (treason); id. at § 201 (bribery).
7' U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl.7.
72

79

Id.
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impeachment includes treason and bribery does not limit impeachment to criminal offenses.
If impeachment is limited to the commission of crimes, to
which law does the Constitution refer? Does it refer to federal
criminal law, state criminal law, common law, or to all three?
Justice Story expressed concern that if an indictable crime must
be committed and if the criminal act were committed outside of
the jurisdiction of the United States, then the official might
escape impeachment. ° If "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" were only limited to crimes as defined by statute or common law, if the phrase was meant to exclude serious abuses of
power and attempts to subvert the Constitution, then the phrase
is quite redundant: it need only say, "other high Crimes"; there
would have been no need to specify "Misdemeanors."
The sixth amendment provides that the trial of "all criminal
prosecutions" shall be "by an impartial jury."8' 1 In addition, no
one may be held to answer for an "infamous crime, unless on
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." ' 82 If an impeachable
offense must be a crime, then the prosecution of that crime
should be before a jury, and if a "high crime or misdemeanor"
is an infamous crime, a grand jury, not the House, must indict.
Needless to say, no evidence exists to suggest that the Bill of
Rights was intended to modify the impeachment procedures
already in the body of the Constitution."'
George Mason, one of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, objected to limiting impeachment to treason and
bribery, because he thought it essential to reach "[a]ttempts to
subvert the Constitution." Thus, he urged the delegates to include "maladministration." When Madison argued that such a
term was too vague, Mason then substituted the phrase "high
crimes and misdemeanors," a term which he told the delegates

80J. SToRy,

supra note 24, at 287.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
Id. at amend. V.
" During the Constitutional Convention, we know that the Committee on Style
initially limited impeachment to treason, bribery, or high crimes and misdemeanors
"against the United States." 2 M. FARAtN,,
supra note 34, at 575. Later, the phrase
"against the United States" was omitted. Id. at 600. We can find no evidence that this
stylistic change meant that the delegates wished to incorporate by reference state criminal
law.
"
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would encompass attempts to subvert the Constitution and other
similarly dangerous offenses.8 4 Mason explicitly and approvingly
referred to the contemporary British impeachment of Warren
Hastings (the Governor-General of India) as based not on treason but on an attempt to "subvert the Constitution." 85 "High
misdemeanors" in British usage included "mal-administration of6
such high officers, as are in public trust and employment."1
The ex-colonists were quite familiar with British usage, and,
while they did not adopt all English practice, their use of the
7
English terminology is not insignificant.
The public ratification debates also support the conclusion
that the phrase "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is not
necessarily limited to "crimes" (whether defined by state or
federal statute or the common law) but includes great offenses
against the federal government (like treason or bribery). In the
state constitutional conventions, which were convened to debate
the new federal Constitution, the state delegates referred to
impeachable offenses in such terms as "great" offenses but not
necessarily criminal.8 8 In these state ratifying conventions, delegates talked of how impeachment would lie if the official "deviates from his duty," 8 9 or if he "dare to abuse the powers
vested in him by the people." 9°
In The FederalistPapers, Hamilton advised:
The subject [of the Senate's] jurisdiction [in an impeachment
trial] are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct

Id. at 550; see 1 id.at 88; 2 id. at 61, 116, 134, 145 (the executive removable
only after "impeachment and conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty."); id. at
67-69 (removal for abuse of power); id. at 172, 185-86 (removal for "treason, bribery,
or corruption"); id. at 550 (removal for "maladministration" rejected as too vague a
term).
. Id. at 550.
6 5 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMM trrTAms *121 (original emphasis omitted); see id. at
*75 (defining treason as "the highest civil crime").
7

See, e.g., R.

114 J. ELLIOTT,

BERGER,

supra note 2, at 87-90.

THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATEs ON THnE ADOPTION OF THE

id.at 538;
4 id. at 37, 44-48, 113-14 (distinguishing between crimes and impeachable offenses); see
also 4 id. at 127 (Iredell stating that president is subject to impeachment for giving
materially false information to the Senate with intent to obstruct the Senate).
'9 4 id. at 47 (Archibald MacLane of South Carolina).
902 id. at 169 (Samuel Stillman of Massachusetts).
FEDERAL CONsTrTUTION 113 (1836) (James Iredell of North Carolina); see 2
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of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation
of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with
peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.91
Hamilton added that it would be unwise to submit the impeach-

ment decision to the Supreme Court because of "the nature of
proceeding." The impeachment court cannot be "tied down"
by strict rules, "either in the delineation of the offense by the
prosecutors [the House of Representatives] or in the construction
of it by the judges [the Senate]. "92 He adds: "The awful discre-

tion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have to
doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most
distinguished characters of the community" forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons."9'
If the impeachment body must make not a statutory but a
political judgment-the subject of impeachment abused the powers vested in him, or subverted the Constitution, or engaged in
"great" offenses-then Hamilton's references to "awful discretion" and to "political" judgments makes perfect sense. Hamilton says it is safer to have a large political body make political,
discretionary judgments. The Supreme Court has no expertise in
such matters, and its small number invites political intrigue.
Joseph Story adopts the Hamiltonian analysis. Story explains
that "no previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment for any official misconduct."9 Nor could a statute be
drafted because "political offenses are of so various and complex
a character, so utterly incapable of being defined, or classified,

9' Tim
ed. 1788).

FEDERALIST

No. 65 at 396 (A. Hamilton) (New Am. Libr. ed. 1961) (McLean

Id. at 398.
Id. (emphasis added).
94 J. STORY, supra note 24, at 288. James Madison, during the first Congress,
made similar statements to the effect that the President could be impeached for serious
offenses which were not crimes. See 1 ANNALs OF CONO. 387 (J. Gales ed. 1834)
(President may be impeached if he refuses "to check" the "excesses" of his aides, if
"he suffers them to perpetrate with impunity high crimes or misdemeanors against the
United States"). The impeachment of Senator Blount (the first impeachment proceeding)
elicited the view that an impeachment is "purely of a political nature. It is not so much
designed to punish an offender as to secure the State." 8 ANNALs OF CONG. 2251 (1798).
12

93
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that the task of positive legislation would be impracticable, if it
''95
were not almost absurd to attempt it.

The American experience supports the conclusion that an

impeachable offense need not be a crime. Concededly, our historical practice, when the House of Representatives has decided

to impeach, is not without ambiguity. In addition, impeachment
trials are often highly partisan affairs; 96 the players in these
dramas are not judges and often not lawyers, and historical
examples are not legal precedents. Nonetheless, to the extent
that such historical evidence is relevant, it shows that the House

of Representatives has prosecuted various types of noncriminal
conduct as impeachable offenses. 97
Moreover, leaving aside historical precedent, to limit impeachment to the commission of crimes is bad policy; such a

limitation is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad
9' J. STORY,supra note 24, at 287. Other classical commentators are in agreement.
BouNTwL, THm CoNsTrririON OF THE UNITED STATES OF TH END OF THE

See, e.g., G.

FIRST CENTURY § 427 (1895); T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRuNc'mIs oF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 177-78 (3d ed. 1898); J. FiNNEY & J. SANDERSON, TH AMmucAN EXEcUTIVE AND
ExEcUTIVE METODS 59-64 (1908); R. FOSTER, CO MmaNTAREs ON Tm CoNsTrrrmON OF
Tm UNITED STATES § 93 (1895); 1 J.KENT, CoMMENTAIES ON AMEmcAN LAW 319-21
(9th ed. 1858); J. POMERAY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSmtrnoNAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 483-93 (1868); W. RAWLE, A VIEw OF THE CONSTrUTION OF THE UNrED
STATES OF AMERICA 209-19 (2d ed. 1829); J. TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTON OF ma UNI ED
STATES § 200 (1899); 2 D. WATSON, THE CoNsTrrTTON OF Tma UNTrED STATES 1027-37
(1910);-3 W. WmaOuOHBY, THE CONSTrrTIONAL LAW OF Tm UNIED STATES, § 931 (2d
ed. 1929); Brown, The Impeachment of the FederalJudiciary, 26 HARV. L. Rnv. 684,
704-05 (1913); Simpson, supra note 2, at 651; Thomas, The Law of Impeachment in the
United States, 2 Am. POL. ScI. L. REv. 378 (1908).
96 Historians have often condemned, for example, the partisan impeachment and
trial of President Andrew Johnson. See, e.g., R. BEROER, supra note 2, at 295.
- For example, Senator William Blount was impeached on Feb. 7, 1798, inter
alia, for conducting a hostile military expedition against Spain, "contrary to the duty
of his trust and station as a Senator of the United States, in violation of the obligation
of neutrality, and against the laws of the United States, and the peace and interests
thereof." HousE Comm. OF Tma JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS, H.R.
Doe. No. 520-2, 93d Cong., IstSess. 126 (1973); see id. at 131 (impeachment of Judge
John Pickering in 1803, inter alia, for appearing "on the bench of the [district] court
for the administration of justice in a state of total intoxication, produced by the free
and intemperate use of intoxicating liquors").
Historically, it is interesting to note that "the test of an impeachable offense in
England was not an indictable, common law crime." R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 297.
President Nixon, who resigned prior to a House vote, "was accused of a variety of
misconduct, some criminal, some not indictable at all, which together amounted to a
serious breach of his official powers." P. HoFFER & N. HALL, supra note 2, at 265.
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because some crimes have no functional relation to the problem

of malfeasance or abuse of office. For example, if an official
in the executive branch, a judge, or a legislator, had been
arrested once for driving while intoxicated, that crime should

not merit the drastic remedy of removal from office.
The proposed limitation is also too narrow, for the "civil

Officer" might engage in many activities which amount to abuse
of office and yet not commit any crimes. For example, if the
President abused his pardon power by unconstitutionally pardoning a judge who had been impeached9 8 or summoned the

Senators from only a few states to ratify a treaty, 99 the President
may have violated no criminal law, but he or she has abused
the office. Similarly, if a federal judge, for no good reason,

refused to decide any cases, he or she has violated his or her
duty under Article III. 10° Some type of wrongdoing must exist

in order for an impeachment to lie 01-there can be no impeachment for mere policy difference-but federal law rejects the
notion that impeachment is narrowly limited to indictable crimes.
Similarly, if the person subject to impeachment may have
committed serious crimes before he or she assumed office, impeachment should still lie in some instances. If those crimes have
a functional relationship to the present office-e.g., it is discov-

ered that a federal judge, who holds a position of trust, committed serious fraud or embezzlement just before accepting the
position, or secured the position by bribery, or the Vice President

99 Contra Ex parte 3 J. ELLIOTT, supra note 88, at 498-500 (corrupt presidential
pardon); see Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925).
" 3 J. ELUOTT, supra note 88, at 498-500 (remarks of Madison during the Virginia
Convention); see 2 id. at 477; 4 id. at 124-25.
'1 In one instance Congress has provided by statute that any "justice or jildge
appointed under the authority of the United States who engages in the practice of law
is guilty of a high misdemeanor." 28 U.S.C. § 454 (1948). It is interesting to note that
this statute sets forth no criminal penalties. Indeed, it is not even placed in title 18, the
title codifying crimes.
,01 See, e.g., Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. (11 Otto.) 341, 343 (1879)
(president may be removed from office by impeachment if found guilty of "wrongdoing"). But see Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. (13 Otto.) 168, 193 (1880) (impeachable
offense involves criminality); but cf. The Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee), 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 457, 535 (1870) (reference to impeachment as power "to punish crime"). For
a discussion of the Kilbourn case, see Hacker & Rotunda, Restrictions on Agency and
CongressionalSubpoenas Issued for an Improper Purpose, 4 CORP. L. REv. 74, 77-81
(1981).
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was discovered to have committed treason before assuming that
office-impeachment should lie although the offense occurred
before the office had been assumed.10 2
The fact that our Constitution, for all practical purposes,
leaves the definition of an impeachable offense to the House
and Senate does not mean either body may exercise arbitrary
power. 03 An impeachable offense need not be a violation of the
criminal law, but that fact does not mean that the term "impeachable offense" has no limits. As the Texas Supreme Court
has noted in a case involving the state impeachment procedures:
There is a vast difference between arbitrary power and final
authority. This court, in most cases, has final authority; but
it has, and can exercise, no arbitrary power. So the Senate,
sitting as a court of impeachment, has, and in the nature of
things should have final authority; but it, too, is wholly lacking
in arbitrary power.104
To protect the subject of an impeachment from arbitrary use
of the impeachment power, the Constitution contains certain
built-in procedural safeguards. Thus, unlike the practice in Great
Britain, 105 when the United States Senators sit as a court of
impeachment, "they shall be on Oath or Affirmation."' 1 6 A
super-majority-two-thirds of the Senators present-must favor
removal for the impeachment to be successful. 1 7 In the special
case of a presidential impeachment the Constitution provides a
special, albeit limited, role for the judiciary. In that case, the
Chief Justice presides, because the Vice President, who would
normally preside and who would take office if the President

-02Cf. Simpson, supra note 2, at 815 (pt. II):
In the state impeachments the decisions seem.all to be the one way. Judge
Barnard was convicted in New York of offences [sic] committed during a
prior term, after a learned argument citing many precedents. So was Judge
Hubbell in Wisconsin.... In all human probability the line never will be
drawn at any other point than one where the offense is connected with the
office; or is near in point of time to the acceptance of the office....
"ISee, e.g., 6 CANNON'S PREcEDENTs OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(1935).
101
Ferguson v. Maddox, 263 S.W. 888, 892 (Tex. 1924).
10,
See J. STORY, supra note 24, at 275.
6.
,6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
107

Id.

§ 634
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were removed, would be in an awkward conflict of interest. 10 8
Though the nuances of the criminal law do not define the
impeachment power, the act of impeachment is still a serious
political act in which the House and Senate should participate
only if the members are satisfied that the officeholder has committed serious offenses which indicate that he or she should no
longer be permitted to hold office. That either the House or
Senate may be able to abuse the impeachment power, as they

have in the past, 0 9 should further caution them when they exercise it.
VII.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Commentators have usually concluded that any impeachment
proceeding, particularly a presidential impeachment, is a political
question." 0 Certainly the language of the Constitution supports
such a view. Article I explicitly states that the House "shall have

the sole Power of Impeachment,""' and that the "Senate shall
have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. "112 The most

natural reading of this language appears to be a "textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.""' The choice of this language was
no accident. It reflects the explicit decision of the delegates to

the Constitutiohal Convention to exclude any role for the courts
other than providing that one judge-the Chief Justice-shall
preside at the impeachment trial of the President."

4

101Id.;

J. STORY, supra note 24, at 277.
109See, e.g., R. BEROER, supra note 2, at 295 (referring to impeachment of Andrew
Johnson as an "attempt to punish the President for differing with and obstructing the
policy of Congress.").
110See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAIv.
L. REv. 1-8 (1959). A few modern commentators have argued to the contrary. See R.
BERGER, supra note 2, at 103-21; I. BRANT,supra note 2, at 183-87; Feerick, supra note
2, at 57.
...
U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 2, cl.5 (emphasis added).
112Id. at art. I, § 3, cl.6 (emphasis added),
"I Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See generally I R. ROTUNDA, J.
Nowmx, & J. YoUNG, supra note 3, at § 216.
114 An early draft proposed that the lower federal courts would have jurisdiction
to impeach, and the Supreme Court to try, but this proposal was eliminated. 2 M.
FAMRAND, supra note 34, at 186, 499-500, 551. Similarly, the delegates rejected a proposal
that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extend to cases of impeachment. Id. at
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In addition, the decision to impeach involves issues that
typically are not judicially discoverable. The decision takes place

only after the House decides that an impeachable offense exists.
The Senate's decision to remove the public official can occur

only when the Senate agrees with the House definition of impeachment. Many of these offenses, as Joseph Story noted, are
"purely political" and are incapable of being defined or classified by statute." 5 The very nature of an impeachable offense
demonstrates that it falls another independent and alternative
test to determine when a legal question is justiciable; there are
"a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
6
resolving" the issue."

186, 427, 493-95.
During the North Carolina state convention debates, James Iredell discussed and
supported the decision to exclude any role for the U.S. Supreme Court in an impeachment inquiry (except that the Chief Justice shall preside in a trial of the President before
the Senate). 4 J. ELxuorr, supra note 88, at 113-14. In the Pennsylvania state convention
James Wilson said that the courts would have a power of judicial review to invalidate
unconstitutional laws, but Wilson never suggested that such a power would extend to
judicial review of impeachment trials. 2 id. at 486-94.
The framers chose to have the Chief Justice preside at the impeachment trial of
the President only because the Vice President would be subject to a conflict of interest.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text..
"' J. STORY, supra note 24, at 287.
226 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. For this reason, we would expect that state impeachment
questions normally should be nonjusticiable, also. The grounds for impeachment under
state constitutions are a matter of state, not federal law. If the state court decides that
a political offense, such as gross abuse of power, is an impeachable offense, the federal
courts must respect that decision. See, e.g., 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowA, & J. YOUNG,
supra note 3, at § 2.14.
Similarly, if a state court were to rule that an officeholder has no property interest
in his or her office, that decision normally would preclude federal procedural rights
attaching to the removal from office. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-47 (1976)
(state law provides that state employee holds position at "will and pleasure" of city
officials).
If state law does give the office some type of property entitlement, federal law
must then determine what process is due. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Yet, even in that case, the federal courts may well decide that
the impeachment hearing offered by the state (e.g., hearing by state legislature) is the,
only process which is due, given the special, unique nature of an impeachment hearing.
Finally, in cases deciding issues of state law, we would expect the federal courts
initially to "abstain" from hearing any federal constitutional claims. See Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-30 (1959) (federal abstention
proper when the state proceeding is "special and peculiar," and "intimately involved
with sovereign prerogative"); see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See
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It is true that one can imagine cases-particularly in the

procedural context-where there appears to be judicially discoverable standards of review. For example, what if the Senators
tried an impeachment case and refused to be on an oath or
affirmation, as the Constitution requires?1 7 On the other hand,
if the country is in such a sad state that the entire Senate is

willing and anxious to ignore a clear constitutional requirement,
and the people do not care and are willing to let the Senate
ignore the Constitution, it is probably already too late for the

court to save us. One of the important effects of the Constitution
giving the House and the Senate the "sole power" regarding
impeachments and precluding judicial review is that Congress
cannot then avoid responsibility by trying to shift ultimate responsibility (or blame) to the judicial branch. Judicial review
should not be an excuse to atrophy political responsibility. 18
The Federalist Papers, which recognized the need for, and
defended the concept of, judicial review," 9 rejected any role for
the courts in impeachment cases. 20 Justice Story, as well, noted

that impeachable offenses "are of a political nature," with "a
very large discretion [which] must unavoidably be vested in the
Court of impeachment. '12' The power of impeachment "partakes of a political character."' 2 2 Thus, the sole jurisdiction to
impeach is in the House of Representatives, "where it should

generally 17 C.

WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 4241-48.
Although impeachment of state judges through the political process (the state
legislature) may not be subject to judicial review, the removal of state judges through a
judicial discipline system would be subject to complete judicial review. When the state
creates a system of removal from office outside of the political system, then we should
expect full judicial review.
." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
"I Judicial review is supposed to be an ultimate safeguard, not an excuse for
Congress to avoid responsibility. In 1935, President Roosevelt, by letter, urged a congressman to support a bill; the letter concluded: "I hope your committee will not permit
doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable to block the suggested legislation."
See R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CAsEs AND NoTEs 11 (2d ed. 1985).
'" See Tim FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
11°
See id. No. 65. "These considerations [the "awful discretion"] seem alone
sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an
improper substitute for the Senate, as a Court of impeachments." Id. at 398.
2I J. STORY, supra note 24, at 280.
'2 Id. at 273; see id. at 287 (many impeachable offenses are "purely political").
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be, in the possession and power of the immediate representatives
of the people."'' The final judgment of the Senate is limited to
removal and disqualification from office, sanctions which "ate
peculiarly fit for a political tribunal to administer, and as will
secure the public against political injuries."' 24 The federal courts'
only jurisdiction is to hear any criminal charges which may also
be brought, but in such instances the judicial sanction does not
include removal or disqualification from office.121
No statute presently undertakes to provide any general definition of impeachable offenses. 126 In such a case the nature of
the proceeding makes it more difficult for the court to apply
any judicial criteria for review. 27 Even if such a statute might
be drafted, any such law-to which both Houses must concur
and secure the President's consent, unless both Houses ovetride
the veto-would be unconstitutional for it might interfere with
the House's sole power of impeachment.'2
Judicial review of any case involving presidential impeachment is particularly ill-advised. The Chief Justice would be disqualified from sitting on any hypothetical Supreme Court review
of the impeachment of the President because the Constitution
129
commands that the Chief Justice preside at the Senate trial.
Moreover, the potential for national confusion would be great

'

Id. at 290.

': Id.

Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c. 7.
116Congress apparently made an effort to define an impeachable offense on a
piecemeal basis in 28 U.S.C. § 454 (1948), which provides: "Any justice or judge
appointed under the authority of the United States who engages in the practice of law'
is guilty of a high misdemeanor" (emphasis added).
"I7J. STORY, sUpra note 24, at 278-79; see Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293
(1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937) (action by Judge Ritter, an impeached judge,
for back-pay, dismissed because Senate has sole power in such cases).
'n Cf. J. STORY, supra note 24, at 280-81.
Any attempt to define the offenses, or to affix to every grade of distinction
its appropriate measure of punishment, would probably tend to more
injustice and inconvenience, than it would correct; and perhaps would
render the power at once inefficient and unwieldly.
1 9 US. CONST. art. I, § 3, dl. 6. The reason that the Constitution provides that
the Chief Justice shall preside at the impeachment trial of the President is not out of
any special desire to draw in the courts or to submit to judicial review. Rather, it "is
to preclude the Vice President, who might be supposed to have a natural desire to
succeed to the office, from being instrumental in procuring the conviction of the chief
magistrate." J. STORY, supra note 24, at 276.
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if the Senate were to declare the presidential office vacant and
the impeached President refused to leave, applied for Supreme
Court or lower court review, and raised various alleged errorsfor example, that some of the Senators who voted against him
were prejudiced and should have disqualified themselves, or that
the definition of impeachment was improper. Because the framers placed the sole power of impeachment in two political bodies-the House and the Senate-it would certainly appear that
such an issue remains a political question.
CONCLUSION

Impeachment is a serious political act and an important
safety valve in our Constitution. Although the courts have a
very limited role to play in such a circumstance, that role is not
an invitation for the national legislature to accept partisan temptations. The. House and the Senate still must decide various
significant questions regarding, for example, the scope and limits
of impeachment jurisdiction, the standard of proof, the sanctions to be imposed, and the nature of an impeachable offense.
The fact that the House and the Senate have final responsibility-that the buck stops there, and that an appeal will lie only
in history, not in the courts-will hopefully encourage the legislators to rise above the politics of the moment.

